

Towards a More Comprehensive Climate Policy

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CITY OF TAMPERE

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Executive Summary for the Busy Ones

The purpose of this work was to find ways for the City of Tampere to complement its climate policy. While the city has made a commitment of carbon neutrality by 2030, its policy still has elements missing which causes the policy to be distant to the city's citizens. How these elements could be included is the purpose of this work.

First, I present possible scenarios of climate change mitigation in the next decades to set the scene. I then narrow down to the City of Tampere by identifying and analyzing the key stakeholders of the city climate policy.

Insight to the work was gained by surveying about 60 Finnish local and national level climate professionals. The knowledge gained through the survey was then deepened by 15 interviews. The interviewees were key city stakeholders who have knowledge and ability to influence the city climate policy.

Out of the survey and interviews, two interlinked action plans were proposed for the city.

#1:

CO-CREATE WITH CITIZENS AND BUSINESSES A FACILITATED PLATFORM TO DISCUSS, SHARE AND INTERACT ON BROAD SPECTRUM OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES.

#2:

CO-CREATE A PROGRAM TO INCLUDE COMSUMPTION BASED EMISSIONS IN THE CITY'S CLIMATE POLICY. ENSURE THE INCLUSION IN ALL CITY OPERATIONS. PLAN AND EXECUTE THE PROGRAM TOGETHER WITH CITIZENS, NGOS, BUSINESSES AND FINANCIERS.

The city is also advised not to declare a climate emergency. This declaration would have been an apt element to boost city's climate policy in 2018 when the policy was revised. Now it is one of the most progressive local climate policies aiming at carbon neutrality by 2030. Declaring climate emergency is not found to bring the needed benefit either in boosting the city's climate profile or in enhancing the citizen engagement in climate work. In addition, as cities and municipalities have a well-regarded role in Finnish society to be the vehicle for citizens to express their self-governance, there is not a very active civic movement on climate issues.

These action points are believed to help Tampere city climate policy to be more comprehensive and inclusive than current one.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Consultancy task

The purpose of this study is to find out how the City of Tampere could complement its current climate policy. One aspect is the climate emergency and why it has not been declared in Finland, which has otherwise very progressive climate policies both nationally and on local levels. I try to find out whether it would be feasible for the City of Tampere to declare Climate Emergency as part of its climate policy actions. The results of the survey are then used to formulate the interviews that deepen the understanding of needs to revise change or augment Tampere city climate policy, especially in addressing whether Tampere include of consumption in its climate policy and more broadly engage citizens.

1.2 Climate Change Mitigation and Tampere Climate Change Mitigation Policy

The challenge posed by raising temperature of the atmosphere due to human activity has been a concern for the past three decades. More recently, boosted by the IPCC report of October 2018 (IPCC 2018), both national and local government climate policies have been put in place, businesses are transforming their business models to be more sustainable, citizen engagement into and media interest towards climate matters has been unforeseen. All Nordic countries have very ambitious climate change mitigation policies (NCM 2019, Bird 2017) and they have done energy and climate policy and implementation co-operation over the past decades (NCN 2014). Consumption is not often accounted for in these policies although new data (C40 Cities 2019) show that consumption in cities is a major cause for urban GHG emissions. Cities and their leadership have a paramount role in the transforming the society sustainable (*e.g.* Floater *et al.* 2014, LSE 2013, Sotarauta & Suvinen 2019).

Tampere City Council set out in 2017 in its strategy a very progressive climate change mitigation goal to be carbon neutral by 2030 (Tampere 2017a, Tampere 2017b). This was further progressed in the City Council decision from June 2018 where it laid out strategic action strands for the work (Tampere 2018a). An execution plan Sustainable Tampere 2030 was initiated in the beginning of 2019 to carry out these strategic goals (Tampere 2018a, 2018b, Tampere 2019a, 2019b). Carbon neutrality for the city means reducing CO₂ emissions by 80% from 1990 levels and by compensating the rest 20% through carbon sinks and the like. The current Finnish government has set its carbon neutrality goal at 2035. The city climate policy does not address GHG emissions due to consumption.

1.3 Climate Emergency Movement

The Climate Emergency movement started in Australia in 2016 (CED 2020, Rode 2019). It is a civic movement that tries to convince local and national governments to take more urgent measures to combat the climate change by declaring a climate emergency and by mobilizing “society-wide resources at sufficient scale and speed to protect civilization, the economy, people, species, and ecosystems” (CED 2020). By Jan 12, 2020, 1301 local and regional governments (over 400 both in the UK and in Canada), 25 nations and the European Union representing in total over 800 million people have declared climate emergency, most of them during 2019. Contradicting this, no Nordic country or city has declared climate emergency to date. This is further puzzling as over 150 Nordic cities have signed *e.g.* the Global Covenant of Mayors Declaration (GCOM 2020) among other international climate commitments and declarations.

Similar “Nordic void” seems to be in signing the Global Climate Emergency Letter by higher education institutions (CL2020): of the 300 signee organizations only a dozen are from the Nordic countries.

2. RESEARCH METHODS USED

In this consultancy, I employed both quantitative (e.g. Heikkilä 2001) and qualitative (e.g. Alasuutari 1995) research methods that will be described below. First, however, to set the scene I will start with a Three Horizons scenario tool (Curry and Hodgson 2008) to describe possible future scenarios of the climate change mitigation. This will give broad lines on what kind of actions would be insightful to propose for the city. Then to further refine the scene, I will do a stakeholder analysis of the key city stakeholders. These two combined with the empirical results will provide basis for the actions that I will propose for the city. A logic framework is created for the proposed action plans.

2.1 Three Horizons Analysis of Climate Change Mitigation Futures

Three Horizons framework (see e.g. Verdis 2018, Curry & Hodgson 2008, Sharpe *et al.* 2016) is a light scenario tool to look at different futures and their strategic fit or relevance with the external environment. I will use it mainly for the purposes of visualization and setting the scene.

The Three Horizons (H1-H3) are depicted (see Fig. 1) as overlapping bell-curves that are shifted in time (x-axis). The y-axis denotes the maturity of each horizon. Maturity here means how well a given scenario fits to the general acceptance, values and moral atmosphere of a given time. One can see the transformation from the business as usual H1 to a sustainable future H3. H1 can be described as a carbon dominant future that is today at its peak. Abundant consumption and use of fossil fuels dominate this scenario. H1 loses its relevance only slowly over decades. This is understandable as we strongly depend on fossil fuels and consume overwhelmingly worldwide.




Fig 1. The Three Horizons for climate policy futures. Modified fig from UNDP (2018).

The third horizon H3 is a preferred future where the current climate change challenges have been settled. H3 calls for drastic changes in behavior and values regarding consumption, mobility and

energy. The main driver for this future is the need of the mankind. H3 relies on novel concepts like circular economy, renewable energy sources, changes in consumption patterns and increased civil activism. While many emergent changes are visible, much depends on how quickly new value driven changes are adopted and technologies developed.

The Intermediary horizon H2 is the most interesting one. Current national and local climate change mitigation policies can be seen to belong to H2. Current climate policies have ambitious goals for some regions to be carbon neutral as early as 2030. Energy and technology development and innovation are key drivers for this horizon.

The H2 scenario bridges us from the current H1 to the visionary future H3. There are indications of societal transitions towards a sustainable future (H3) but they are still emergent. While alternate and more sustainable technologies are developed and the societies are preparing to be more resilient, this phase is still in large part dependent on fossil fuels. The duration of H2 will largely depend on how well the technological development will mitigate climate change and how rapidly the values of the society will change. In Table 1 below, I have summarized in more detail essential features of these three horizons.

	H1: Carbon dominant future	H2: Future of change	H3: Sustainable future
Characteristics	Carbon dominance that will prevail for long. Changes seen but very weak.	Taking advantage of new technology, materials. Minuscule individual or corporate behavioral changes imposed.	Changed consumption and mobility patterns on individual and corporate level. Emerging signals seen already today.
Hinders for change	Financial gains Individual behavior, values	Financial gains Individual behavior, values	Availability of finances for enabling investments.
Drivers for change	Fear of the warming future and its possible impact. Other inevitable changes seen, e.g. abundant consumption.	Notion that tech & other changes are not enough but changes in consumption and mobility patterns needed.	Values, individual choices. General opposition to abundant consumption. Energy, material and communication technologies.
Challenges for maintaining status- quo	Inevitable change seen in fuels. Abundant consumption challenged.	This horizon is by nature a labile or intermediate one.	Individual and societal behavior and values become overwhelming and drive the change.
GHG Emissions. Resulting local scenario ¹	High. Business as usual.	Moderate. Climate change adaptation, moderate work on mitigation.	Low. Intensive mitigation work, adaptation.
Typical energy outlook	Fossils prevailing Renewable (sun, wind, biomass) emerging.	Renewables growing. Clean (including small scale nuclear).	Renewables prevailing. Some nuclear. Use of fossil fuels drastically limited.

Table 1. Three Horizons framework. Description and characteristics of the three horizons. See also Fig. 1.

¹ See Sheppard *et al.* (2011).

When grounding the above to Tampere and its climate policy, key groups need to be addressed. While both all groups have proponents of sustainable future horizon, they have equally proponents of continuing the current state of affairs resulting in a stalemate in terms of progressing climate policy for a more sustainable future.

Next, I will analyze different stakeholders of the city and their role in climate change policy formation.

2.2 Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder analysis² (Freeman 2010, 31–51) is a tricky exercise when considering a city whose stakeholders are many, diverse, intertwined and interconnected (Riege & Lindsay 2006). In this study, we are defining stakeholders from the point of view of the city climate policy: who are the ones that need to be considered and who have influence on the decision. Thus, *e.g.* city level decision-makers are included as stakeholders. In trying to tackle this, I have chosen a more complex classification of stakeholders and follow Mitchell *et al.* (1997). The framework is also known as the Salience Model (*e.g.* Wiki 2020). It bases itself on three presuppositions that the stakeholders possess in relation to the subject at hand: legitimacy, power and urgency. Of these, three features one alone or two together define relevant features of the stakeholders. This will reveal more salient and subtle features of the stakeholder groups and is particularly useful in a case of a city. I have divided city's stakeholders³ into eight groups according to Mitchell *et al.* (1997) (see Fig 2 and Table 2).




Fig. 2. Stakeholder grouping according to Mitchell *et al.* (1997). For explanation on numbering, see Table 2.

² See Freeman (2010) for an interesting review on the history of stakeholder analysis.

³ This stakeholder analysis is partially based on the survey and interviews, partially on newspaper and periodical coverages. My own work with all the stakeholders (and the named subgroups) during the past two decades provides an additional insight.

No (cf. Fig. 2)	Stakeholder groups	Description of group (color refers to Fig X)	Groups in our case
1	Discretionary stakeholders	These stakeholders have little urgency or power and are unlikely to exert much pressure. They have legitimate claims. (yellow region)	Citizens at large
2	Dormant stakeholders	These stakeholders have lots of power but no legitimacy or urgency and therefore are not likely to become heavily involved. (blue region)	Businesses Trade Unions NGOs
3	Demanding stakeholders	These stakeholders have little power or legitimacy but can make lots of “noise” because they want things to be addressed immediately. (red region)	Special interest groups Lobby organizations Young active citizens
4	Dominant stakeholders	These stakeholders have both formal power and legitimacy, but little urgency. They tend to have certain expectations that must be met. (green region)	Moderate politicians Middle-class
5	Drastic ⁴ stakeholders	These stakeholders have power and urgency but are not pertinent to the project. (purple region)	Activist groups Some businesses Some lobbyists
6	Dependent stakeholders	These stakeholders have urgent and legitimate stakes in the project but little power. These stakeholders may lean on another stakeholder group to have their voices heard. (orange region)	Active citizens Academia
7	Definitive stakeholders	These stakeholders have power, legitimacy and urgency and therefore have the highest salience. (brownish region at the intersection of all other regions)	Key politicians Key civil servants National government
8	Non- stakeholders	These stakeholders have no power, legitimacy or urgency. (outside the regions defined by the circles A, B, and C)	

Table 2. Salience model stakeholder groups and their descriptions from Mitchell et al. (1997). The last column denotes the stakeholders that in our fit to given category.

The importance of careful stakeholder analysis has been shown in a climate change study of six US cities where stakeholder views varied strongly depending on the social context, knowledge frameworks, role of the stakeholders and temporal time span they employ (McCormick 2016). Thus, for a city, the stakeholder analysis is both paramount and challenging. Cities would benefit also from a more detailed network analysis of their stakeholders (Grönfors 1982, 161–172).

When analyzing the eight stakeholder groups of Tampere (Table 2), three groups stand out as key groups. Definitive Stakeholders (group 7) are naturally at the heart of the decision-making process within the city and they are key to shaping the city policies. In addition to key politicians, the group includes key civil servants as well as the national government and its respective ministries. As the national government has a very progressive climate policy in place as well and rely on the largest cities in its implementation, the national government's and city's activities and actions are tightly intertwined.

⁴ The term “Dangerous stakeholder” coined by Mitchell and co-workers (1997) was changed to “Drastic stakeholder” as it might be dangerous to name a stakeholder group “dangerous” in this case.

Some active lobbyists, some businesses and activist groups make up stakeholder group 5 or Drastic stakeholders. This group needs to be actively not only courted but interacted with as it comprises groups that exercise great influence on the political decision makers if need rises and act swiftly.

Dominant stakeholders (group 4) includes both moderate politicians from all parties as well as their main constituent, i.e. the large middle class. This group is currently silent in itself but should be paid attention to as when active they, too, exercise great influence on the city decision making machinery.

Demanding (group 3) together with Dependent stakeholders (group 6) may be influential opinion leaders. The stakeholder analysis model of Mitchell *et al.* (1997) provides insight as how to proceed when introducing novel and possibly controversial actions to the city climate policy.

3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

3.1 Survey Method

A cross-sectional survey (Bryman 1989, 31–41, Heikkilä 2001, Alanen 2011) was conducted on Nov 7, 2019. The sample was 64 climate change professionals (of which 59 responded) in Finnish municipalities and the national government. The sample was not representative but rather an insight into climate change professionals' views. These professionals would be the people who would be approached locally on Climate Emergency declaration issues. They would also be the ones to prepare possible changes into national and local climate policies.

Two networks and one workshop of these professionals gathered in Tampere on Nov 7, 2019 for their respective meetings. Two of the groups were city-driven: the Climate Municipalities Network run by the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities and the Climate City Leaders, whose members are working to improve the inclusion of climate issues in the decision-making processes of their cities. The third network was the Climate Network of the regional offices of the Ministry of Environment.

The survey questions (see Appendix 1) were mostly multiple choices with an option for an open answer. In one question I used the four-point Likert scale (Heikkilä 2001, 53). Background information included sex, age, professional experience and employer. Care was taken to formulate the questions so that they would cover the topic and be understandable to the respondents. The survey was tested with four individuals to check the unambiguity of the questions and whether the respondents understood the questions easily. The questionnaire was modified according to feedback from the test group. A note explaining the purpose of the survey was included in the beginning of the questionnaire.

Rather than conducting the survey over network, I chose to maximize the responses by delivering the questionnaire in person in paper format in the three respective meetings and had the questionnaires collected at the end of the meetings. The number of respondents was 59 out of 64.

The answers were then fed into IBM SPSS software (e.g. IBM SPSS 2020, Bryman 2004, Heikkilä 2001) for light analysis the results of which are discussed below in the analysis section.

3.2 Survey Analysis

The survey produced interesting results that provide a good understanding why Climate Emergency movement has not gained much ground in Finland. Some of argumentation can be expanded to explain behavior in other Nordic countries, too (Heard 2019, Greaker *et al.*).

Of the 59 respondents⁵, 30% were male and 70% female. Almost 90% worked on climate related issues. For most, the employer was a municipality (52%) followed by national government (36%), private sector (9%) and third sector or NGOs (3%). About half of the respondents had less than five years of professional experience. Of the more seasoned half, 16% were managers. The seniority in the workplace is depicted in Fig 3. Of the respondents, 4% were under 30 yrs old, 33% over 50 yrs of age and the 59% fell in the age range 30-50 yrs.

First the respondents were asked to define how they viewed emergency in general by giving a value to different features of emergency on a four-point Likert scale (1-4, with 1=strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3=agree, 4= strongly agree) . The alternative “always a serious and acute danger to people” was chosen by 97% of the respondents (“agree” or “strongly agree”). The second most descriptive for an emergency was that “the authorities are effectively addressing the emergency threat” with which 86% agreed or strongly agreed. The third most chosen was “authorities like the police get extra powers” which was agreed by 75% of the respondents. These responses did not vary against any background variable. When asked whether citizens’ rights were limited or whether emergencies mean confrontation between people and authorities, 40% and 64% of respondents, respectively, disagreed with the statements.




Fig 3. The position of the respondents in their workplace. This reflects also their seniority. The legends are BLUE: Expert, experience under 5 years; RED: expert, experience over 5 years; GREEN: manage who has subordinates (manager 1); ORANGE: manager whose subordinates have subordinates (manager2).

More than 50% of the respondents had not heard of the Climate Emergency movement (by Nov 7, 2019). Of those who had heard of it, only a handful had discussed it at their workplaces, and further of those, only at one workplace it was agreed that climate emergency should be declared.

⁵ It should be noted that some respondents did not answer all the questions and the effective respondent number varied between 54 and 59.

The interviewees gave rather unanimous views on why the climate emergency movement has not attracted more attention in Finland. It is quite interesting that overall in responses to all questions there was very little if any variation against any of the background variables. This could be interpreted that the views expressed are broadly accepted.

Regarding climate emergency, 59% of the respondents stated that the reason it has not been declared is simply that the movement is not known in Finland. The next two most popular responses were more insightful: 53% of respondents chose option “It is more typical of us to act than to declare”. Similarly, about half stated that “the dramatization of things and the Finnishness do not match” and 40% echoed “Climate change ought not to be dramatized. We need to proceed calmly but decisively.” Interestingly, no respondent was of the view that reason not to declare a climate emergency could be due to movement’s undemocratic nature. Thus, Rode’s claim (Rode 2019) that democracy issues could be behind Nordic countries not declaring climate emergency was not confirmed.




Fig 4. Respondents' opinions of the characteristics of an emergency. Clockwise from the top left: (1) Always a serious danger (2) Officials are to remove the threat, (3) Officials are given more rights, (4) People tend to take more care of each other, (5) Citizens' rights are limited and (6) Confrontation between citizens and authorities increase. Color-codes are Orange: strongly agree, Green: agree, Red: disagree and Blue: strongly disagree.

When asked about why climate policies omit consumption (scope 3), the answer was very clear: you get what you measure. Practically all climate policies monitor direct production based emissions only (scope 1 and scope 2). Especially the private sector employees held this view.

Two other reasons were given for not including consumption: “the sources of consumption-related emissions are unknown” and “it is too difficult to achieve changes in society's consumption patterns” indicating two major challenges in current climate discussion. Again, broad stability in responses against the background variables.

It emerged from the survey that there were clear reasons why the declaration probably would not fare well in Finnish cities. While the current state of climate change was considered clearly an emergency (over 90% of the respondents), not declaring it is grounded in the ways of working in Finnish society and clearly a strong belief in the current actors - cities and the national government - taking care of issues. This conclusion may naturally be biased due to the survey cohort selection. It has been argued (Heard 2019) that the strong trust towards public institutions in Nordic countries stems from the long tradition of social capital in Nordic societies and that this social capital transforms into trust towards

both media and public institutions. Further literature on the activism in Scandinavia and interviews that will be analyzed below corroborate this conclusion to a degree (see Heard 2019 and references therein, Greaker *et al.* 2018).

3.3 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews (de Leeuw 2012, 4-5, Grönfors 1982, 105-107) were conducted to provide insights how the City of Tampere could complement its climate policy. The group of people interviewed was again a directed selection. I selected the group of key informants (Parsons 2008) on three grounds: a) the group would consist of people who would have both insights into the topic and capability to influence the city climate policy foci, b) the group would be heterogeneous enough to provide a broad view on the topic, and c) key stakeholders would be included.

All interviewees were promised anonymity. They all agreed to the interviews being taped and their names to be listed in the appendix of the report. The recordings are kept anonymous in my personal files separate from the research report and analysis. List of interviewees is in the Appendix 2.

Based on the survey results, half a dozen questions were formulated for the interviews. First two questions were addressing climate emergency and the three others took the discussion deeper to explore civic activism and emissions due to consumption, and how they could be dealt with in Tampere city climate policy.

The interview questions were tested with one professional on qualitative research. Questions were slightly modified according to the feedback and one question was completely revised for clarity. The set of questions is in the Appendix 3.

I conducted the 15 interviews⁶ between Jan 12 - Feb 16, 2020. Eleven were carried out face-to-face and four were conducted over the phone. The interviews were transcribed and translated into English only where necessary.

3.4 Interview Analysis

The interviewees represent various stakeholders of the city from professors to ex-activists, from civil servants to serial entrepreneurs, from national level policy makers to local decision makers.

The interviews corroborated the survey result of how people view a state of an emergency: urgency and acute need for rescue-type of actions to secure lives or property from an immediate threat. While the word “emergency” was seen a word of strong emotions, still most of the interviewees said that in the situation we are facing, climate change is an emergency.⁷ A prolonged state was not seen solely as an exclusion argument:

“An emergency can also be a longer state of events. People live normal life even during wars.”
(Interviewee M)

The group was rather unanimous that current climate change situation is a state of emergency or it results in spot-like emergencies across the globe. However, when asked about whether City of Tampere should declare climate emergency the answers started to vary.

⁶ There were originally 16 interviewees planned but one had to go and be the Prime Minister of Finland.

⁷ It should be noted here that material for this work and most of the writing were completed before the global Covid-19 pandemic. Thus, people’s view on what is an emergency and what is not may have changed. See also Jones (2020).

"[Climate Emergency movement] has started from civic activism, stemmed from among citizens. (...) Also locally, it should stem from there. (...) This is difficult (...) All actions that could help in that [climate change mitigation] would be welcome (...) But declaring it really does not fit into Finnish soul landscape. "(Interviewee D)⁸

"The city should declare climate emergency. I've been following this and a crucial point was when some national governments declared it. To my understanding, it has had a major impact in the UK. In Finland, this has not happened." (Interviewee F)

Even those who were strongly stating that current state of climate change is an emergency hesitated:

"I am yet cautious about it [declaring a climate emergency]. If we do that, then, I think, we should answer to people's expectations: what will happen now? (...) Naturally there will be strong emotional reactions (...) How does the emergency present itself? How should I as an individual act? What will the city do? Where do I hide? How can I rescue myself from this emergency?" (Interviewee C)

"A declaration is not enough. You would need a plan." (Interviewee L)

Many questioned what would be the benefit of the emergency declaration as the city already has a working mitigation policy in place. It was also discussed whether a declaration would be too much a partisan political act rather than a city wide accepted deed. Those who said that the city should declare an emergency, stressed that a plan should be in place for the declaration to be meaningful. There was much concern about the possibility of increasing climate angst especially among young people.

The declaration was seen as a possible political tool for the city: (i) it would link the city to the group of environmentally progressive foreign cities, a group the city has been identifying itself since late 1990s (Häikiö & Niemenmaa 2007, 41-56); (ii) the declaration could also serve as a vehicle to attract national (government's) attention to specific climate actions and (iii) Tampere could profile its climate stance by being the first Nordic city to declare climate emergency. Locally, political parties have shown increasing interest to climate matters in the wake of the local elections of 2021.

The President of Finland Mr. Niinistö took a strong stand for active climate work in his New Year's speech (Niinistö 2020): *"Climate change is a major threat. (...) Every nation has set their objectives, Finland at the forefront. This is commendable. But objectives do not yet amount to action."* That statement was very much in line what both the survey and the interviewees revealed when asked about cities declaring climate emergency. This was put in a nutshell by Interviewee A: *"Today, we declare a lot but act much less."*

The civic movement in Finland has not been very visible in climate issues. Traditionally, civic and third sector activism as well as the work of NGOs has been very strong in Finland and other Nordic countries. Now, however, that seems to be changing. When asked about the civic activism in Finland, most interviewees stated that it works rather well. However, given the long history of civic activism through associations and societies, it was noted that today these organizations start to be part of the establishment rather than vehicles for change.

"The traditional third sector works very closely with existing structures and institution, and one can well question its role as a change agent." (Interviewee G)

⁸ The quotes have been translated from Finnish. All hesitations and the like have been omitted from transcriptions and quotes are written as complete text.

“It happens - and there is some research evidence to back it - that in about five years an organization establishes itself so that it becomes a bureaucratic unit comparable to a national or local government [unit]. (Interviewee I)

Further, it was mentioned that these formal forms of activism are competing of people's free time. Thus, many new forms of activity take place mostly in the internet and social media.

Many raised a point that the municipality should take an active role almost as to complement the weak role of the current third sector and civic activism

“The municipality exists for its citizens. The municipality should listen to its citizens and their concerns (...) and proceed accordingly.” (Interviewee H)

“The municipalities are very important in Finnish society. They are our vehicle of local autonomy.” (Interviewee F)

“Municipalities should especially be a forum for discussing common issues and acting upon them.” (Interviewee D)

The inclusion of consumption into city's climate policy was widely accepted by the interviewees.

“Consumption should absolutely be included in the measures. The municipalities have already started and are being drivers for circular economy (...)The old trick of stimulating private consumption to accelerate the economy does not make much climate sense.” (Interviewee O)

“The city may take a climate role in matters that are on its responsibility like housing, mobility, urban structure. I seem to return to these paramount things over and over again.” (Interviewee J)

However, changing consumption or mobility habits of people was seen difficult because those measures get very personal. It was noted that focusing on consumption might turn the focus away from the most important issues like energy production or private car usage.

“Buying organic beer that is made in Argentina makes no sense” (Interviewee E)

It was hoped that if the municipality got active in the citizen interface, care were taken not to divide people in to those who are responsive to climate change mitigation actions and those who are not as that approach may not end in good results.

The fifteen conducted interviews provide useful insights into measures that the city should consider when revising its climate policy and thinking of actions that it should implement.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CITY OF TAMPERE

Climate change mitigation is one of the top five strategic priorities of the City of Tampere. While the city's climate policy is progressive, it may need a boost in actualizing the urgency and need for immediate actions both by the city, by businesses as well as by citizens. Based on the above analyses I will propose two broad interlinked actions that seem viable both in impact and in acceptance for the city to consider. In addition, I will suggest how to proceed on declaring climate emergency.

4.1 Climate Emergency

One proposed mechanism for boosting a city's climate work is declaring Climate Emergency (Rode 2019, CED 2020, Solomon 2019)⁹. The basic argumentation behind the climate emergency movement is solid: more immediate attention should be paid to climate change mitigation and actions should be more drastic than today (Solomon 2019). The emergency approach is a novel and not necessarily an easy one for cities to adopt. City council initiatives to declare climate emergency have proposed in Finnish cities of Helsinki, Turku and Tampere (YLE 2020). None of these is, however, backed by public debates or civic movement on climate emergency but are induced from within local political scenes. No decision has been made in any of these cities. To date (March 2020), no Nordic national or city government has declared climate emergency.

When considering how to advise the City of Tampere on climate emergency declaration, I evaluated the responses from the interviews and the survey and reflected those against the stakeholder analysis.

The city has a council resolution to be carbon neutral by 2030, a timeline that is very progressive even among cities that have declared climate emergency. The city has reduced its emissions per capita from the 1990 levels by more than 45% and has currently the lowest carbon emissions per capita in Finland. The city has completed road-maps with annual actions how to reach carbon neutrality by 2030. Most recently, as the first city in Finland and one of the first in the Nordic countries, the city has adopted climate budgeting as part of its regular financial budget. In other words, major city actions are already under way.

From the empirical data neither a consensus about nor arguments for declaring climate emergency emerged. Concerns, on the other hand, were many from climate angst to people's divide and to possible backfiring effects. Benefits that were expressed of a declaration were of secondary nature (see Krause 2013): raising the city's climate profile in the national context or joining the city with its peers in an international context.

In addition, when considering key city stakeholder groups (above called Definite, Dominant and Drastic groups) and their participation in the climate discussion and in interviews, declaring an emergency would most probably not create desired outcome.

It was suggested instead (Huikuri 2020) that the city could adopt a more positive approach to accelerate action towards climate change mitigation. Efforts to turn climate change activities collectively towards urgent but positive actions could serve better the purpose for a city trying to engage citizens more actively to climate work than declaring an emergency.

Therefore, I do not suggest for the City of Tampere to declare a climate emergency but to start the work with its citizens on a more positive note, either alone or with the city region and businesses.

However, there lies two areas that the city's current climate policy does not cover well: citizen engagement and emissions from consumption (scope 3), and I will suggest next actions for them.

4.2 City as a Platform for Citizens

The Finnish constitution grants self-government to the citizens of municipalities (Finlex 2020, Ch. 11, Section 121). This is the basis for the existence of municipalities in Finland. The municipalities are also responsible for a broad range of services from health care to education, from cultural activities to

⁹ See Rode, P (2019) for one of the first analyses of the climate emergency movement and its implications to urban climate policies of cities.

sports, from city planning to a legion of various permit. This broad responsibility of a municipality of its citizens together with the reference to the constitution has created a situation in the Finnish society that there exists trust between cities and citizens (Heard 2019). Fiack & Kamieniecki (2017) argue that “collaborative effort that increases trust and social reciprocity is more likely to result in GHG reductions”. Cities and municipalities are the public body that interacts with citizens directly, not the national government.

In the context of climate change, cities not only have the opportunity but a responsibility to hear out their citizens and provide them with a platform to discuss, share and act upon climate issues. Citizens have increasing interest in how their own behavior influences climate change such as energy usage, mobility habits or consumption. There is a wealth of information available but in many cases it is overwhelming and at least superficially contradicting. Individual citizens are increasingly interested in monitoring and following their own GHG emissions. There are also many on-going activities among citizens so city’s intervention would need to be co-created with the citizens. Academia should be included.

The purpose of this activity would be to gear towards citizens adopting more sustainable mobility and consumption habits and a more sustainable life style in general. This could also alleviate climate-angst especially among young people. The city would benefit from a valuable interaction platform with its citizens.

ACTION PLAN #1:

CO-CREATE WITH CITIZENS AND BUSINESSES A FACILITATED PLATFORM TO DISCUSS, SHARE AND INTERACT ON BROAD SPECTRUM OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES.

4.3 City and Sustainable Consumption

The current global climate policies miss the role of consumption. Consumption for example in Finland doubles the per capita emissions (Salo *et al.* 2017). Therefore, accounting for these is vital in creating the transformation for a more climate friendly consumption and way of living. The interest of citizens in climate issues channels itself often through consumption related matters.

Practically all those surveyed and all those interviewed were for the inclusion of consumption into city climate policies. This view is also well supported by literature (*e.g.* Rode 2019, Ala-Mantila *et al.* 2016, Ottelin *et al.* 2018 and references in them).

As the city has little or no regulatory means at its disposal, the way forward is to set examples in city’s own climate work and subsequently advocating sustainable consumption. Many cities in Finland try to prolife themselves with various climate change mitigation actions like mobility or energy production. No city to date has profiled themselves with sustainable consumption. If city of Tampere were to take that path, it would profile itself well in the national scene. This action plan could nicely be interweaved with other activities geared towards and with citizens.

This kind of effort could be done in collaboration not only with citizen groups and NGOs but very much so with businesses. Doing this in partnership with the private sector would also increase its visibility and also possibly credibility at least among some key stakeholders. Including universities and research intitutes in this action point as well, would bring the needed knowledge and analysis skills to the city’s disposal.

ACTION PLAN #2:

CO-CREATE A PROGRAM TO INCLUDE COMSUMPTION BASED EMISSIONS IN THE CITY'S CLIMATE POLICY. ENSURE THE INCLUSION IN ALL CITY OPERATIONS. PLAN AND EXECUTE THE PROGRAM TOGETHER WITH CITIZENS, NGOS, BUSINESSES AND FINANCIERS.

4.3 Logic Framework

The proposed actions should be subjected to a Logic Model analysis (WKKF 2004) before entering into execution to see whether the desired outcomes would be reachable through proposed activities. In Fig 5 below, I have depicted the basic ingredients of the Logic Model for the task at hand.

The input constraints will dictate the extent and scale of activities that can be carried out. Critical are both the financial and human resources at disposal. These combined will affect details of the activities to be carried out. The activities themselves should also be subjected to citizen-driven refinement to be based on open dialogue between citizens and the city. The citizens have been included as input for the activities as their activity is a crucial ingredient although the activities have an impact on citizens themselves.




Fig 5. Output driven logic model frame for the proposed actions.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this consultancy study, we have studied whether Tampere city climate policy needs revising and if yes, what would be the possible broad actions to do so.

The work started with an analysis of the climate change scenarios that will have impact on the societies globally including Finland. From that analysis it was deduced that current climate policies bridge the way to a sustainable future. The more effective they are, the sooner they will have impact and trigger sustainable development.

When working with a city whose stakeholders are many inter-linked organizations and individuals, a stakeholder analysis is paramount in trying to understand what kind of changes or inclusions would be possible to win acceptance. I chose a more complicated way of analyzing the stakeholders and was able to deduce three groups of stakeholders that need to be paid special attention to.

The empirical part of the work was two-fold. First, I surveyed about 60 climate professionals in Finland about their view on whether the current state of climate change is an emergency and what areas should be focused on in cities' climate policies. These findings were deepened with 15 semi-structured interviews among climate policy influencers and stakeholders.

My analysis resulted in suggesting to the city not to declare climate emergency due to its limited value-added or impact on stakeholders. The main suggestions for the city were to augment its climate policy. The current policy while very progressive is still very much contained within the city. To enhance the climate policy I suggest two broad action plans. The first is to engage citizens and businesses into mitigating climate change more actively. The second is a plan to include sustainable consumption into the city's climate policy and build an action plan for that.

These action plans are based on empirical data and are believed to help Tampere city climate policy to be more comprehensive and inclusive than current one.

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Appendix 1. The questionnaire

Appendix 2. List of Interviewees

Appendix 3. Interview structure

Appendix 1. The questionnaire (translated from Finnish)

Hello,

This short survey is part of my final thesis to Executive M. Sc. in Cities program of the London School of Economics. For some questions, you may choose from several options. It may be possible that I will do interviews after the survey. If you are interested in participating in these interviews, please, enter your contact information at the end of the survey. Please, also indicate if you wish to receive summary of this study in Finnish next spring. In any case, the results will be processed anonymously.

Thank you in advance for your help!

Kari Kankaala
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tel. 050 351 3020

Background of the survey

Climate change mitigation originates strongly from cities and is linked to urbanization in many ways. So far, mitigation efforts have focused on controlling direct emissions, but indirect emissions from individuals and businesses related to consumption (energy, materials, food, clothing,) are becoming increasingly central.

Launched in Australia in 2016, the Climate Emergency Movement aims to declare a climate emergency and mobilize people and various sectors of society extensively and rapidly to radically reduce both direct and consumption-related greenhouse gas emissions. By November 5, 2019, 1,177 cities in the world had declared a climate emergency, including Portuguese and British Parliaments. In the Nordic countries, no city has declared a climate emergency.

- Which of the following do you think describes the term "emergency" in Finland. Use the scale to describe how well you think the statement describes the emergency. Put a cross in the appropriate column.

When we talk about emergency, ...	1 poorly	2	3	4 well
... it is always a serious and acute danger to people.				
... the authorities are effectively addressing the emergency threat.				
... people are taking care of each other more than normally.				
... authorities like the police get extra powers.				
... movement and rights of citizens are restricted.				
... emergency creates confrontation between authorities and citizens.				

- Have you heard of the Climate Emergency Movement?

☐ yes
☐ no

- Has it been discussed in your organization?

☐ yes
☐ no

- If so, did you think that your city/state should declare a climate emergency?

☐ yes
☐ no

- The cities declaring the climate emergency are both small towns with thousands of inhabitants and metropolises with millions of inhabitants and everything in between. What do you think is the reason why the world's London, Bristol, Sydney, Lübeck, Potsdam and Naples have declared a climate emergency, but not a single Finnish city? You may choose several options.

(P.T.O.)

- ☐ Climate emergency and its background are not known in Finland.
- ☐ It is more typical of us to act than to declare.
- ☐ Declarations of such emergencies are undemocratic.
- ☐ Climate emergency is not a real emergency.
- ☐ In the view of Finnish cities, declaring a climate emergency is not an important measure.
- ☐ State and city actions already in place are sufficient.
- ☐ Climate change ought not to be dramatized. We need to proceed calmly but decisively.
- ☐ The dramatization of things and the Finnishness do not match.
- ☐ Something else. What? _____

6. What do you think is the reason why climate change mitigation is more focused on direct emissions than consumption-related emissions? You may choose several options.

- ☐ The sources of consumption-related emissions are unknown.
- ☐ Only direct emissions are monitored nationally and internationally.
- ☐ Emissions from consumption will be taken into account in reducing direct emissions.
- ☐ It is too difficult to achieve changes in society's consumption patterns.
- ☐ Consuming is not central to combating climate change.
- ☐ It is impossible to calculate consumption emissions.
- ☐ Something else? What _____

7. Do you think that urban / state action plans to mitigate climate change take sufficient account of consumption emissions?

- ☐ yes
- ☐ no

Background Questions

I am ☐ male ☐ female ☐ prefer not to answer

Content of my job

- ☐ is closely linked to climate change mitigation or adaptation
- ☐ is not closely related to climate change mitigation or adaptation

My job is

- ☐ I work in our organization as an expert (under 5 years)
- ☐ I work in our organization as an expert (over 5 years)
- ☐ I have managerial responsibilities in our organization, my subordinates are not subordinate
- ☐ I work as a manager in our organization, and my subordinates are subordinate

Age ☐ less than 30 years ☐ 30-50 years ☐ over 50 years

I work at ☐ company ☐ municipality ☐ national government ☐ third sector

I wish

- ☐ to receive a summary in Finnish
- ☐ to participate in possible telephone or skype interview

Please, enter your contact information below to receive a summary or to participate in a follow-up interview.

name:

email:

phone:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TROUBLE!

Appendix 2. List of interviewees

Title	Name	Title	Organization
Mr.	Aleksi Jäntti	Vice-Mayor	City of Tampere
Mr.	Jaakko Stenhäll	Vice-Mayor	City of Tampere
Ms.	Sanni Pöntinen	Development manager	City of Tampere
Mr.	Matias Ansaharju	Development manager	City of Tampere
Ms.	Eva Wissensz	Entrepreneur	Sepia Agency Ltd
Dr.	Liisa Häikiö	Professor	Tampere University
Ms.	Pauliina Jalonen	Specialist	Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
Mr.	O-P Pietiläinen	Manager	Ministry of Environment
Ms.	Karoliina Tuukkanen	Circular Economy project manager	City of Tampere
Dr.	Jorma Keskinen	Professor, Member of national IPCC group	Tampere University
Ms.	Soili Ingelin	Civil servant	Regional branch of Ministry of environment
Ms.	Hannele Tiitto	Project manager	Regional Council of Pirkanmaa
Mr.	Jouni Perttula	Head of risk management	City of Tampere
Mr.	Peer Haataja	Director	Chamber of Commerce
Ms.	Taru Pilvi	Head of innovation	Tampere University

Appendix 3. The Interview structure

Introduction. KK tells briefly about the purpose of the interview, about the survey results and introduces Climate Emergency Movement.

- I. What kind of state is a state of emergency? How would you define it? What are characteristics of that state?
- II. Could the current state of climate change be called a state of emergency and should one declare a climate emergency?
- III. Should City of Tampere declare climate emergency? Why/Why not?

KK explains again that Climate Emergency Movement is a civic movement that tries to make citizens and cities to act to mitigate climate change through own decisions and choices.

- IV. How do you see civic society functions in Finland? Should civic activity in climate change mitigation be enhanced? Should a municipality have a role in that? Why?
- V. Individual's question "What can I do" is tied much around one's own consumption: food, clothing, travel, heating. Including consumption about doubles the GHG emissions per capita in Finland. How do you feel: should the emissions due to consumption be taken into account e.g. in the Tampere climate policy?